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INTRODUCTION
In the years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and
Hurricane Katrina’s destruction along the Gulf Coast in 2005, the United
States has continued to modernize how it responds to disasters and
emergencies.1 One of the most important facets of any response to a
disaster is protecting and preserving the health of the victims and the
general public. To that end, the federal and state governments have
developed a patchwork scheme of laws intended to grant various levels of
authority and civil immunity to government actors and volunteer
responders as a means of making emergency resource acquisition and
distribution more efficient. These laws are also meant to encourage
volunteers to provide their skills to those in need within the
disaster-affected state.2
*

I would like to extend my gratitude to William Dow, Amy Magnano, and the editing staff of the
Seattle University Law Review for their invaluable assistance in the development of this article.
1. INST. OF MED., GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE FOR USE IN
DISASTER SITUATIONS: A LETTER REPORT 10 (Bruce M. Altevogt et al. eds., 2009).
2. See Lainie Rutkow, Jon S. Vernick, Maxim Gakh, Jennifer Siegel, Carol B. Thompson &
Daniel J. Barnett, The Public Health Workforce and Willingness to Respond to Emergencies: A
50-State Analysis of Potentially Influential Laws, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 64, 65 (2014) (enumerating
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As the large-scale response to the disaster begins to mount, front line
hospitals and medical practitioners may receive material and personnel
support from the federal government or other states. As additional medical
practitioners from beyond the disaster-affected state respond, these
practitioners are given immunity from civil liability under a mixture of
federal and state laws developed to encourage and assist volunteers who
provide medical assistance.3 Conversely, local first-responding private
physicians face the greatest risk of liability for the care they provide under
such trying conditions. Unlike their out-of-state counterparts, private
physicians practicing in the disaster-affected state are often not granted
immunity from civil liability.4
Practicing medicine during a disaster can leave a local practitioner
vulnerable to many potential causes of action, such as the following:
(1) negligence, by the practitioner or the hospital under a theory of
corporate negligence or respondeat superior; (2) constitutional
claims, for lack of due process or equal protection; (3) criminal
liability, for inadequate treatment or providing treatment beyond the
scope of their usual practice; (4) Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) violations, for privacy breaches or
sub-standard recordkeeping; (5) Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) violations, for alleged discrimination in the triage criteria
used for the providing of care; (6) Emergency Medical Treatment and
Labor Act (EMTALA) violations, for failing to comply with the
Act’s requirement to provide a medical screening and render the
patient medically stable upon arrival to the hospital.5

While practitioners might successfully defend themselves from
liability, litigation is a less-than-optimal outcome. Defending against a
claim places many burdens on a practitioner, including (1) taking time
away from the practitioner’s ability to see patients;6 (2) taking an

influential state laws on this topic); Christina Y. Chan, Support for the First Line of Defense in Public
Health Emergencies, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1347, 1352–63 (2011) (discussing federal laws protecting
public and private health care entities and practitioners).
3. See Rutkow et al., supra note 2, at 65.
4. See Sharona Hoffman, Richard A. Goodman & Daniel D. Stier, Law, Liability, and Public
Health Emergencies, 3 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 117, 122 (2009) [hereinafter
Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health] (discussing where patients will go after injury in a
disaster and the general disparity in public actor versus private actor liability immunity); Sharona
Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health Emergencies, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1913, 1953–56 (2008) [hereinafter Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility] (discussing in detail the
ways in which private actors are denied liability immunity).
5. Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health, supra note 4, at 120.
6. Jonathan Thomas, The Effect of Medical Malpractice, 19 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 306, 310
(2010).
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emotional and psychological toll on the practitioner;7 (3) negatively
impacting his or her professional reputation by calling into question the
practitioner’s competency as a medical professional;8 (4) increasing his or
her medical malpractice insurance premiums;9 and (5) potentially
imperiling the practitioner’s license to practice medicine in the state (or
states) in which he or she possesses a medical license.10 These burdens
may generate a chilling effect that will dissuade private practitioners from
providing medical care because disaster conditions negatively impact their
ability to care for patients. Granting civil liability immunity to private
practitioners during times of disaster will allow those private practitioners
to avoid having to defend against a claim altogether, thus negating the
chilling effect and will allow doctors to care for their patients to the full
extent of their abilities, no matter how severely disaster conditions may
impact the care being provided.
This Note identifies how the Pacific Northwest Emergency
Management Arrangement member states of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and
Washington11 apply tort liability and immunity to medical professionals
during times of disaster. This Note also identifies an example statutory
scheme that, if enacted, will provide equal protection to all physicians who
provide care to disaster victims, regardless of their local or out-of-state
status.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Practice of Medicine
When a disaster strikes, local hospitals and their associated
physicians are often the first to respond, as these practitioners treat disaster
victims who make their way to nearby hospitals.12 These hospitals may
receive a volume of patients that exceeds a hospital’s “surge capacity.”

7. See S. Sandy Sanbar & Marvin H. Firestone, Medical Malpractice Stress Syndrome, in THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SURVIVAL HANDBOOK 9, 9–15 (2007).
8. Thomas, supra note 6, at 310.
9. Morgan Lewis Jr., Medical Malpractice Costs Continue to Climb, MED. ECON. (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/clinical/practicemanagement/medical-malpractice-costs-continue-climb [https://perma.cc/TA6G-G7K6].
10. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 18.130.180 (2015).
11. While the Canadian province of British Columbia and the Yukon Territory are also
Arrangement members, they will be excluded from the scope of this note because of the systemic
differences in health care delivery and management of medical liability in the United States and
Canada.
12. See Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health, supra note 4, at 122 (discussing where
patients will go after injury in a disaster).
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Surge capacity is the maximum limit of a hospital’s available resources to
treat patients.13
As resources become depleted, medical practitioners are forced to
make difficult strategic and ethical choices regarding how to allocate the
care and resources available. This decision-making process is known as
triage. Various methods of triage exist, the most common of which is
practiced in emergency rooms across the United States every day. The
guiding principle of day-to-day triage in an emergency room is to rank
incoming patients by the severity of their injuries, expediting the treatment
of the most gravely injured patients, while having patients with less critical
complaints wait.14
Alternatively, the guiding principle of disaster triage, which is
applied when a hospital meets or exceeds its surge capacity, is to adjust
the ranking criteria to place the focus on public care and saving the greatest
number of people possible.15 This new focus on saving the many at the
cost of the few gravely injured, coupled with the strain on personnel and
material resources, can give rise to questions regarding the applicable
standards of care and the potential causes of action that may be brought
against the hospital or medical practitioner responding to disasters.
The practice of medicine has two different and distinct standards of
care that medical practitioners must abide by to avoid incurring liability: a
medical standard of care and a legal standard of care.16 The medical
standard of care is “the type and level of medical care required by
professional norms, professional requirements, and institutional
objectives.”17 This medical standard of care is often institution-based and
dependent on the circumstances under which the care was rendered.18 The
legal standard of care is “the care and skill that a healthcare practitioner
must exercise in particular circumstances based on what a reasonable and
prudent practitioner would do in similar circumstances.”19Although the
legal standard of care is defined on a state-by-state basis, the various
definitions align with the general principle above because of medical
malpractice’s long common law history.20
13. See Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility, supra note 4, at 1918.
14. Dawn Cushman, When Disaster Hits, Where Does the Standard of Care Go?, 31 J.
HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT. 6, 11 (2011) (discussing the underlying goals of triage patient
management).
15. Id.
16. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 45 (distinguishing the medical and legal standards of care in
the medical profession).
17. Id. at 45 (defining the medical standard of care).
18. Id. (discussing the underlying factors considered in the medical standard of care).
19. Id. (defining the legal standard of care).
20. See Peter Moffett & Gregory Moore, The Standard of Care: Legal History and Definitions:
The Bad and Good News, 12 W.J. EMERGENCY MED. 109 (2011).
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B. Declarations of Emergency, Disaster, or Public Health Emergency
An invaluable tool for addressing any disaster is a “declaration of
emergency” (a.k.a. an “emergency declaration”). An emergency
declaration is often the event that triggers the granting of emergency
powers to a governmental executive officer, agency, committee, or person
or group tasked with managing the response to a disaster. The practice of
granting extraordinary powers and immunity from liability extending from
the use of those powers, has existed alongside the idea of democratic
governance since the Roman era.21
The decision to make an emergency declaration balances the factors
that support the existing legal authority structure (e.g., limits on executive
authority, governmental borrowing and purchasing limitations, medical
device testing standards, etc.) with the ability to effectively and efficiently
respond to the conditions that created, or are the result of, the disaster.22
When the existing bureaucratic processes impede the ability of the
government to respond to a disaster, the executive officers of federal, state,
and local governments may respond by declaring a state of emergency—
if their respective legislative branches have granted them the authority to
do so.
Granting extraordinary powers to the government and its agents
during times of crisis also serves to create a divide between public medical
practitioners and private medical practitioners. When a declaration of
emergency, disaster, or public health emergency is made, medical
practitioners who are a part of the governmental response to the disaster
or emergency, or who are acting in a volunteer capacity, are given special
immunities.23 These immunities are granted in an effort to encourage
volunteerism, but private practitioners—those who are “on call” or on-thejob and being paid during the disaster—are not given any special
immunity.24
Because this Note looks specifically at the medical aspect of a
disaster, the focus will be on declarations identifying the existence of a
public health emergency. A public health emergency is a condition where
21. Under normal circumstances, the executive branch of the Roman Republic consisted of two
elected Consuls, who shared the duties of the executive branch. During exceptional
circumstances—almost exclusively war—the Roman Senate passed legislation requesting the Consuls
elect a Dictator. It was understood that “circumstances might arise in which it was of importance for
the safety of the state that the government should be vested in the hands of a single person, who should
possess for a season absolute power, and from whose decisions there should be no appeal to any other
body.” WILLIAM SMITH, A DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES, 404–08 (John Murray
ed., 1875).
22. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 46.
23. See infra Part I.C.
24. Ryan Bailey, The Case of Dr. Anna Pou: Physician Liability in Emergency Situations, 12
AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 726, 729 (2010).
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“a health situation’s ‘scale, timing or unpredictability threatens to
overwhelm routine capabilities.’”25 Declarations of emergency can be
made at the federal, state, and local levels of government.
At the federal level, several acts of Congress have granted the
President the power to declare a general state of emergency. The two main
acts are the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act (Stafford Act) and the National Emergencies Act.26 Under the Stafford
Act, the President has the authority to declare a state of emergency and
render aid to a state if the Governor of that state indicates that local and
state resources have been overwhelmed and are in need of federal
assistance.27 Under the National Emergencies Act, there is no specific
definition of what constitutes a disaster or emergency, thus providing the
President much broader discretion to declare an emergency and utilize the
powers granted by Congress.28
After the President has declared a general state of emergency, the
Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) is also authorized to declare a public health emergency “in case of
a disease, disorder, or bioterrorist attack that justifies such a declaration”29
pursuant to the Public Health Service Act.30 When the Secretary makes a
determination that a public health emergency exists, the Secretary may, at
that time or retroactively, grant waivers exempting hospitals and health
care practitioners from regulatory requirements imposed upon them by
Medicare, Medicaid, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA),31 and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA).32
At present, the only state in the Pacific Northwest Emergency
Management Agreement that has granted its governor the authority to
declare a public health emergency is Oregon.33 The Oregon statute defines
a public health emergency as existing when there is an act of biological
terror, a new or previously eradicated source of infection that has the
potential to be highly contagious, an epidemic, a natural disaster, a
25. Rebecca Mansbach, Altered Standards of Care: Needed Reform for When the Next Disaster
Strikes, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 209, 209 (2011).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5206 (2011); 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2011).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 5191(a) (2011).
28. See 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2011).
29. See Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility, supra note 4, at 1922.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2014).
31. EMTALA is a federal law that requires a hospital’s emergency room to stabilize and treat
any patient who arrives there, regardless of his or her insurance status or ability to pay. See EMTALA,
AM. C. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, https://www.acep.org/News-Media-top-banner/EMTALA/
[https://perma.cc/26X5-7KK7].
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b–5 (2010).
33. OR. REV. STAT. § 433.441(1) (2014).
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chemical spill, a chemical attack, a nuclear accident, or a nuclear attack,
and such event poses a high probability of (1) a large number of deaths in
the affected population; (2) the creation of a large number of serious or
long-term disabilities in the affected population; or (3) widespread
exposure to an infectious or toxic substance that may cause significant
harm in the future.34
C. Tort Immunity Statutes
The legislative purpose of statutes granting tort immunity is to
encourage medical practitioners to provide medical care to those in a
disaster area by lessening the medical practitioners’ concerns about
possible claims made against them resulting from the care they provide in
the disaster area.35 The medical practitioners who receive immunity under
these laws are shielded from any liability, so long as the act was not
criminal, willful misconduct, or grossly negligent.36 These statutes have
been enacted both federally and by the states.37
In this Note, the medical practitioners that are protected under these
statutes will be classified into three categories: government actors,
volunteer actors, and private actors. Government actors are individuals,
agencies, or organizations acting to render aid within their capacity as a
governmental entity, as an agent or employee of a governmental entity, or
under the authority or direction of a governmental entity. The most
common source of tort liability immunity for government actors is
statutory sovereign immunity. Volunteer actors are individuals or
organizations that are acting to render aid while receiving, or expecting to
receive, little or no compensation. Alternatively, private actors are
individuals or organizations acting to render aid while receiving, or
expecting to receive, compensation.
1. Federal Statutes
Several federal statutes granting tort liability immunity during public
health emergencies exist. These statutes cover government, volunteer, and
private actors.

34. OR. REV. STAT. § 433.442 (2014).
35. Judith C. Ahronheim, Service by Health Care Providers in a Public Health Emergency: The
Physician’s Duty and the Law, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 195, 199 (2009).
36. Chan, supra note 2, at 1361.
37. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-11 (2013); 42 U.S.C. §247d(a) (2006); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 14501–14505 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090 (2015); IDAHO CODE §§ 5-330, 46-1017,
39-1391c, 39-7703 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.800, 30.805, 676.340, 676.345 (2015); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 4.24.300, 38.56.080 (2015); Chan, supra note 2.
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a) Federal Statutes Granting Government Actor Immunity
Medical practitioners who provide medical services as government
actors receive statutory immunity derived from governmental sovereign
immunity by means of precluding suits for their actions as government
actors, agents, or deputies under the Federal Tort Claims Act.38 There are
three statutes that clearly illustrate the practice of a statute deputizing a
medical practitioner as an agent of the government to qualify for
government actor immunity.
The first statute created was the National Disaster Medical System
(NDMS).39 The NDMS consists of rapidly deployable groups of volunteer
medical practitioners, with each group specializing in specific kinds of
disaster response.40 HHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
the Department of Defense, and the Department of Veterans Affairs jointly
administer the NDMS program.41 The authority to activate and deploy the
NDMS groups is granted to the Secretary of HHS by the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.42
The second of these statutes is the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness (PREP) Act.43 The PREP Act focuses on the tools and
materials, such as “drugs, devices, and biological products”44 categorized
as “covered countermeasures,”45 that a medical practitioner may require to
provide treatment during a public health emergency and the liability that
may result from the use of those covered countermeasures.46 Under the
PREP Act, the Secretary of HHS has the authority to make a determination
that “a disease[,] . . . health condition[,] or other threat to health constitutes
a public health emergency, or that there is a credible risk that the disease,
condition, or threat may in the future constitute such an emergency.”47 The
Secretary also has the authority to specify “the manufacture, testing,
38. See Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility, supra note 4, at 1938.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-11 (2013).
40. Chan, supra note 2, at 1354.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-11 (2013)).
43. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247-6d to 247d-6e
(Supp. 2007).
44. Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health, supra note 4, at 121.
45. A “covered countermeasure” is a broad statutory definition that encompasses any drug,
biological product, or device that is authorized by the Secretary of HHS for use in responding to an
emergency. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(1)(c) (2006). When the covered countermeasure is used to
combat the natural spread of disease, it is referred to as a “qualified pandemic or epidemic product.”
See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(7)(c) (2006). When the covered countermeasure is used to combat “any
biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent” it is referred to as a “security countermeasure.”
See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b(c)(1)(B).
46. Targeted Liability Protections for Pandemic and Epidemic Products and Security
Countermeasures, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2005).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b)(1) (2006).
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development, distribution, administration, or use of one or more covered
countermeasures.”48 Under the PREP Act, “a covered person49 shall be
immune from suit and liability under Federal and State law with respect to
all [tort] claims for loss . . . resulting from the administration to or the use
by an individual of a covered countermeasure . . . .”50 Immunity is only
waived for a “death or serious physical injury” resulting from “willful
misconduct.”51 An entity or person is engaging in willful misconduct when
they knowingly and intentionally, with no legal or factual justification, act
or fail to act with the purpose of accomplishing a wrongful goal,
disregarding known or obvious risks that are so great that it is highly
probable the potential harm will outweigh the potential benefit.52
The third statute is the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).53 Under
normal circumstances, a government agency and its agents may be subject
to a civil suit for damages when their actions cause injury, or otherwise
incur liability under the FTCA.54 However, during a state of emergency,
the agency and its actors may not be subject to a claim under the FTCA’s
discretionary function exemption.55 This exemption bars claims against
actions of a federal employee for decisions made based on consideration
of public policy that involved the exercise of the employee’s discretion or
judgment, unless the decision intrudes upon the constitutional rights of an
individual.56 The United States is also immune from claims brought under
the FTCA if the injury underlying the claim was caused by exercise of
governmental discretion, “whether or not that discretion is exercised
negligently or wrongfully, whether or not it is exercised at all, and whether
or not it is abused.”57
This discretionary exemption grants broad immunity to
governmental agencies and their “on-the-job” employees during a state of
emergency to enable them to make the best possible judgment calls on
matters of public policy. Hypothetically, this government immunity could
apply to medical practitioners employed by or acting under the direction
of a government agency. In short, when a state of emergency exists, the
48. Id.
49. A “covered person” is the United States, or a person or entity who is: the manufacturer;
distributor; program planner; the qualified individual prescribing, administering, or dispensing the
covered countermeasure; and any of the agents, employees, or officials of the persons or entities
described above. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(2) (2006).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1) (2006).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)(1) (2006).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(c)(1)(A) (2016).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2014).
54. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–72 (2006).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2014).
56. AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PROOF OF FACTS 241 (3d ed. 2009).
57. Lane v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 864, 867 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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controlling emergency statutes under which governmental agencies act
and governmental agents exercise their powers provide those government
actors with immunity under the FTCA through the discretionary function
exemption.
b) Federal Statutes Granting Volunteer Actor Immunity
Another route that medical practitioners may take to secure tort
immunity while practicing medicine during a disaster is to practice
medicine as a volunteer. Rather than becoming a de facto or de jure
government employee and securing government actor immunity, it may be
more practical for most medical practitioners to provide volunteer medical
services to receive federal statutory immunity. The Volunteer Protection
Act of 1997 (VPA) grants properly licensed volunteers rendering aid on
behalf of government entities and nonprofit organizations limited
immunity for harm that results from any act or omission performed within
the scope of their responsibilities, provided that act or omission does not
amount to “willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless
misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of
the individual harmed.”58 The VPA also establishes a minimum level of
protection for volunteer aid workers, including volunteer medical
practitioners, by preempting any state law that fails to offer equal
protections, but not those laws that offer greater protections.59
A limiting factor of this immunity is that medical practitioners will
only receive volunteer immunity if they are providing services for less than
$500 per year or on an uncompensated volunteer basis.60 This
compensation limitation prevents paid medical practitioners from utilizing
volunteer immunity during disasters. The purpose of this type of
legislation is to counter the deterrent effect potential volunteers might feel
as a result of possible liability against them.61
c) Federal Statutes Granting Private Actor Immunity
Medical practitioners who provide medical services as private actors
and charge for their services are often left ducking for cover when seeking
liability protections under federal statutes designed to protect medical
practitioners and other emergency personnel responding to disasters.62 The
58. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a) (2014).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 14502 (2014).
60. The Volunteer Protection Act defines a “volunteer” as “an individual performing services
for a nonprofit organization or a governmental entity who does not receive . . . compensation (other
than reasonable reimbursement or allowance for expenses actually incurred)[] or any other thing of
value in lieu of compensation, in excess of $500 per year . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501–05 (1997).
61. Ahronheim, supra note 35, at 199 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1) (2006)).
62. Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health, supra note 4, at 122.
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greatest likelihood of a private physician receiving immunity under federal
public health emergency laws is through the PREP Act; however, this
immunity is limited to harms related to the use of a covered
countermeasure approved under the Act.63 Hypothetically, a paid medical
practitioner could use a covered countermeasure in the course of treating
a patient;64 however, if the use of the covered countermeasure were to
cause harm to the patient, the limitation on liability would only extend to
the use of the controlled countermeasure.65
2. Interstate Mutual Aid Agreements
A mutual aid agreement is a cooperative agreement entered into by
states, territories, provinces, tribes, and other governmental entities for the
purpose of sharing strategic resources such as personnel, volunteers, and
information when responding to a public health emergency.66 This type of
cooperative response to emergencies originated as a solution to the
ineffective utilization of volunteer medical practitioners during the
Hurricane Katrina disaster, where questions regarding licensing impeded
volunteers.67 There is one national-scale interstate mutual aid agreement
that includes all fifty states, known as the Interstate Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC),68 and several smaller
regional-scale agreements, which may include multiple states and some
governmental entities from neighboring Canadian and Mexican territories
and provinces.69
a) Interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
Originally approved by Congress in 1996 with thirteen member
states,70 the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a
national-scale mutual aid agreement administered by the National
Emergency Management Association. To request aid under EMAC, the
63. Chan, supra note 2, at 1361; Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health, supra note 4,
at 122.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)(1).
65. Id.; Chan, supra note 2, at 1361.
66. DANIEL D. STIER & MELISA L. THOMBLEY, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
PUBLIC HEALTH MUTUAL AID AGREEMENTS: A MENU OF SUGGESTED PROVISIONS 1 (2007),
http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/Mutual_Aid_Provisions.pdf [https://perma.cc/96MM-UWT3].
67. Ahronheim, supra note 35, at 202.
68. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996).
69. See generally An Updated Overview of the Great Lakes Border Health Initiative, MICH.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.michigan.gov/mdch/0,4612,7-132-54783_54875170665—,00.html [https://perma.cc/3JFE-MSB3]; OR. PUB. HEALTH DIV., UPDATE REPORT ON
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN OREGON 11 (2008), https://public.health.
oregon.gov/Preparedness/mediacenter/Documents/phep0708.pdf [https://perma.cc/329H-2TTR].
70. Emergency Management Assistance Compact §1.
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governor of a state must declare a state of emergency, assess the needs of
the state, determine the amount by which the state’s local resources will
fall short, and place a request with the National Emergency Management
Association.71 Under EMAC, when a licensed medical practitioner is sent
to a state requesting aid, the requesting state must recognize the medical
practitioner as licensed to practice medicine.72 However, EMAC’s liability
protection only extends to “[o]fficers and employees of a party state
rendering aid” by treating them as if they were agents of the requesting
state for purposes of liability and immunity.73 This immunity extends to
any good faith act or omission occurring during the rendering of aid, so
long as the act or omission does not amount to “willful misconduct, gross
negligence, or recklessness.”74
Unfortunately, EMAC fails to provide immunity from liability to
volunteers.75 Some states address this shortcoming directly with
legislation extending the immunity to responders who are not state
employees.76 However, EMAC does not expressly define what an
“officer,” “employee,” or “agent” is.77 This ambiguity thus allows the
possibility of arguing that individuals deputized by the state, or otherwise
acting under the orders of the state or a state employee, can be considered
an “officer,” “employee,” or “agent” of the state and, therefore, qualify for
immunity under EMAC.78
b) Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement (PNEMA)
The Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement
(PNEMA)79 is an intergovernmental regional mutual aid agreement
between the states of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, as well as
the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and the Yukon Territory.80
The agreement allows any member to request aid from other member
states in the event of a “natural or technological emergency or disaster” or
71. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996);
see Emergency Management Assistance Compact, NAT’L EMERGENCY MGMT. ASS’N,
http://www.emacweb.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=99&Itemid=339
[https://perma.cc/53YB-R6RU].
72. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, art. V.
73. Id. at art. VI.
74. Id.
75. Id. at art. VI (restricting immunity from liability to “officers and employees of a party state”).
76. See IND. CODE § 10-14-3-19(d) (2013); IOWA CODE § 135.143.2 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
37-B, § 784-A (2013); Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility, supra note 4, at 1942.
77. See generally, Emergency Management Assistance Compact, §1.
78. See Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility, supra note 4, at 1942.
79. Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement, Pub. L. No. 105-381, 112 Stat.
3402 (1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 402.250 (2015).
80. Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement, Pub. L. No. 105-381, 112 Stat.
3402 (1998).
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“enemy attack.”81 For a member state to request aid, the authorized
representative may make a request to the authorized representative of any
other member state, either verbally82 or in writing, with a description of
the emergency service required, the amount and type of assistance
required, and a time, place, and point of contact for responding forces.83
The licensed medical practitioner receives the same licensing
recognition under the PNEMA as they would under the EMAC. However,
unlike EMAC, PNEMA offers liability protection to any person or entity
of a member state by treating them as if they were agents of the requesting
state for purposes of liability and immunity.84 Under PNEMA, all
government actors and volunteers are extended liability immunity for their
acts or omissions in rendering aid, or while maintaining or operating any
equipment associated with rendering aid, unless that act, omission,
maintenance, or operation amounts to “willful misconduct, gross
negligence, or recklessness.”85
3. State Statutes
States have also enacted statutes to address the issue of responder
liability during disasters.86 States have implemented a variety of
approaches to deal with the issue of responder liability, and the approach
implemented can vary drastically from state to state. This note will focus
on the four states that are members of the Pacific Northwest Emergency
Management Arrangement.87 This section explores the various approaches
adopted by the four states and highlight the lack of immunity available to
paid medical practitioners during disasters.
a) Alaska
i. Alaska State Statutes Granting Government Actor Immunity
According to the Alaska Code, a deputized medical practitioner or
one made an agent of the State to provide medical services on behalf of
the State can receive government actor immunity in the same manner that
a deputized medical practitioner or one made an agent of the federal
81. Id.
82. A verbal request for aid must be accompanied by a written confirmation within fifteen days
of the initial request. Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement, Annex B, art. III(2)
(2005).
83. Id. art. III(2)(A)–(C).
84. Id. art. VI.
85. Id.
86. See infra Part I.C.3(a)–(d)
87. Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement, Pub. L. No. 105-381, 112 Stat.
3402 (1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 402.250 (2015).
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government can receive government actor immunity.88 During a state of
emergency, “the state, a district of the state, an employee, agent, or
representative of the state or a district, or a volunteer or auxiliary civilian
defense worker or member of an agency”89 an “officer or employee of
another state,”90 or “a volunteer authorized by the state, a municipality or
other political subdivision of the state, or a federal agency to engage in a
civil defense activity”91 is not liable for damage to property or injury or
death to a person if the harm occurred while in the process of preforming
a civil defense activity92 or obeying a civil defense order or
regulation.93Additionally, out-of-state volunteers rendering aid under the
EMAC and PNEMA mutual aid agreements are afforded the same liability
as a condition of Alaska’s membership in those agreements.94
ii. Alaska State Statutes Granting Volunteer Actor Immunity
Under Alaska’s version of a Good Samaritan law, an individual who
encounters an “injured, ill, or emotionally distraught person”95 who
“reasonably appears . . . to be in immediate need of emergency aid in order
to avoid serious harm or death . . .”96 at a “hospital or any other location”97
and “renders emergency care . . . or counseling . . . is not liable for civil
damages [from] an act or omission in rendering emergency aid.”98
Additionally,
[a] member of an organization that exists for the purpose of providing
emergency services is not liable for civil damages for injury to a
person that results from an act or omission in providing first aid,
search, rescue, or other emergency services to the person, regardless
of whether the member is under a preexisting duty to render
assistance, if the member provided the service while acting as a
volunteer member of the organization.99

Under this statute, a volunteer is defined as an individual who is paid
less than $10 per day for a total of less than $500 a year, exempting any
88. See supra Part I.C.1(a).
89. ALASKA STAT. § 26.20.140(d)(1) (2015).
90. Id. § 26.20.140(d)(5).
91. Id. § 26.20.140(d)(6).
92. In Alaska, civil defense activities include medical service, vaccination, and other actions to
protect public health. Id. § 26.20.200(2).
93. Id. § 26.20.140(b).
94. See Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877
(1996); Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement, Annex B, art. VI (2005).
95. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090(a) (2015).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. § 09.65.090(b).
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costs incurred while providing the emergency service.100 However, this
immunity will not apply if (1) the person rendering care is a physician who
has a preexisting duty to render emergency care,101 or (2) the actions or
omissions that occurred while rendering aid amount to gross negligence,
recklessness, or intentional misconduct.102
iii. Alaska Statutes Granting Private Actor Immunity
Under Alaska’s Good Samaritan statute, as originally passed by the
legislature, a private medical practitioner working in a hospital would have
qualified for immunity.103 However, the Supreme Court of Alaska held
that physicians and other individuals who had taken on a preexisting duty
to render care were ineligible to receive liability immunity under the Good
Samaritan statute.104
In Deal v. Kearney, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the
legislative purpose of including physicians under the Good Samaritan
statute was to encourage physicians to render emergency medical services
to people who were not their patients and not to exempt physicians from
any preexisting duties owed to patients the physician had before the
emergency started.105 Under Alaska’s statutes, private medical
practitioners who are being paid for their work lack immunity for
emergency services rendered during a condition of disaster emergency.106
b) Idaho
i. Idaho Statutes Granting Volunteer Actor Immunity
Idaho has two statutes granting immunity to volunteer actors: a Good
Samaritan statute107 and a statute granting immunity to health care
professionals providing charity care.108 Under Idaho’s Good Samaritan
statute, any person or group offering or rendering first aid or medical care

100. See id.
101. Deal v. Kearney, 851 P.2d 1353 (Alaska 1993) (holding that physicians do not receive
immunity from the Good Samaritan statute if they have a preexisting duty to render emergency care);
see also Bunting v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 971 (D. Alaska 1987) (holding Alaska’s “Good
Samaritan” statute provides partial immunity only to persons who had no preexisting duty to render
aid).
102. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090(d) (2015).
103. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090 (2016).
104. See Kearney, 851 P.2d at 1353 (holding that physicians do not receive immunity from the
Good Samaritan statute if they have a preexisting duty to render emergency care).
105. Kearney, 851 P.2d at 1356–57.
106. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090(b) (2016).
107. IDAHO CODE § 5-330 (2015).
108. Id. § 39-7703.
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in good faith by stopping at an accident is given immunity.109 The
immunity will exist until the person receiving aid is delivered to a hospital,
placed in the care of an ambulance attendant, or delivered to the office of
any person who treats ill or injured persons.110 This immunity prevents any
civil claim for damages.111 However, the immunity will not apply if it can
be proven that the volunteer actor rendering care provided care or
otherwise treated the person in a grossly negligent manner.112
The strict conditions imposed in Idaho’s Good Samaritan statute
significantly limit the immunity it could provide to medical professionals
responding to a disaster. The statute limits the scope of immunity in two
ways. First, the statute restricts immunity physically by requiring the
rendering of aid be initiated at an accident site.113 Second, the statute
terminates the immunity when the aid recipient is delivered to a hospital,
clinic, or other emergent care facility.114 This restriction, while protecting
medical first responders, does not cover the medical professionals who are
receiving the patient at a hospital, clinic, or office. The second Idaho
statute providing protection to volunteer actors offers immunity for any
civil action as a result of the actor providing charity care if the patient has
signed a waiver explaining that the care is to be rendered with no
expectation of payment and that the medical practitioner will be granted
immunity.115
The preauthorization requirement makes this statute unsuitable for
offering immunity to medical practitioners under most disaster response
conditions. Several factors may impede the ability of medical practitioners
providing charity care during a disaster to secure a signed waiver of
payment from a patient: (1) the physical location and condition of the site
where the medical practitioner is rendering care may be unsuitable for the
creation, retrieval, or filing of waivers (e.g., imminent danger necessitating
rapid treatment and evacuation, loss of power, flooding, rendering care in
a field hospital, destruction of hardcopy files, destruction of computers or
loss of computer networks, lack of administrative personnel, etc.); (2) the
response to a mass casualty event may be too frantic and chaotic to
successfully locate and duplicate forms; (3) medical practitioners may
prioritize triaging patients and providing emergency medical care over
securing waivers.

109. See id. § 5-330.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. § 39-7703.
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ii. Idaho Statutes Granting Private Actor Immunity
In an effort to encourage doctors of any specialty or training to
provide emergency care, Idaho presumes that any licensed physician116 is
“qualified to undertake . . . any emergency or surgical care.”117 This
presumption requires that the treatment provided by the medical
practitioner is the result of a good faith judgment that the care is required
based on the condition and best interest of the patient, and that the care is
rendered in a manner that is not grossly negligent under the
circumstances.118 Under the statute, any physician or hospital that
performs emergency care will be granted immunity from any civil action
resulting from that care.119
Eby By & Through Eby v. Newcombe is the controlling case law for
this statute.120 In Eby, the Supreme Court of Idaho found that, while this
statute was intended to encourage a physician of any specialty to render
emergency care or first aid, it was not intended “to affect or change the
standard of care or liability of physicians in the ordinary doctor/patient
relationship.”121 The Supreme Court of Idaho opined that when an
ordinary doctor–patient relationship exists, the attending medical
practitioner does not qualify for immunity under the statute when
rendering emergency care.122
c) Oregon
i. Oregon State Statutes Granting Government Actor Immunity
When either a state of emergency or a public health emergency is
declared, medical practitioners who are registered on the “emergency
healthcare provider registry,”123 or those who volunteer to render medical
services, are considered agents of the state for tort liability and immunity
purposes.124 Additionally, those locations designated as “emergency
health centers” by the Oregon Health Authority and “persons operating
emergency health care centers designated [by the Health Authority] are
agents of the state . . . for the purposes of any claims arising out of services
that are provided . . . without regard to whether the . . . person is

116. Id. § 39-1391(c) (2015).
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. Id. § 39-1391(c) (2016).
120. Eby By & Through Eby v. Newcombe, 780 P.2d 589 (1989).
121. Id. at 591.
122. See id. at 592.
123. Id. § 401.654 (2015).
124. Id. § 401.667 (2016).
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compensated for the services.”125 However, this immunity will only extend
to those emergency health centers that have “credentialing plans that
govern the use of emergency health care providers registered under [the
emergency health care provider registry] and other health care providers
who volunteer to perform health care services.”126
ii. Oregon State Statutes Granting Volunteer Actor Immunity
Oregon’s Good Samaritan statute is unique among the PNEMA
states, as it restricts the class of people covered to professional medical
practitioners.127 However, the statute maintains the usual requirements that
the care be voluntarily rendered without expectation of compensation and
to a person who, based on the circumstances, is in need of emergency
medical or dental care as the final means to prevent death or serious
harm.128 Further, it grants immunity from any action for damages that
result from an act or omission while rendering aid, so long as the aid
rendered was not grossly negligent.129 However, Oregon’s statute imposes
location-specific conditions on the availability of statutory immunity.
Specifically, the statute only provides immunity for “[m]edical or dental
care not provided in a place where [such care] is regularly available,
including . . . a hospital . . . first aid station [or] office of a physician,
physician assistant, or dentist.”130
iii. Oregon State Statutes Granting Private Actor Immunity
The State of Oregon currently lacks a statutory scheme to grant
immunity to medical practitioners who are paid during a state of
emergency.
d) Washington
i. Washington State Statutes Granting Government Actor Immunity
During a state of emergency, no “covered volunteer emergency
worker” can be held liable for any act or omission committed while
performing “covered activities”131 rendered during the course of
responding to the disaster,132 unless those acts or omissions amount to
125. See id. § 401.667(2) (2015).
126. See OR. REV. STAT. § 401.667(4) (2015).
127. See id. § 30.800; see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090(a) (2015), IDAHO CODE § 5-330
(2015), WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.300(1) (2015).
128. See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.800 (2015).
129. See id. § 30.800(2).
130. Id. § 30.800(1)(a).
131. WASH. REV. CODE § 38.52.180(3)(a) (2015).
132. Id. § 38.52.180(2).
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“gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.”133 A “[c]overed
volunteer emergency worker” is an emergency worker who is not
receiving, nor expecting to receive, compensation from the state as an
emergency worker and who is not a state or local employee, unless that
employee is on unpaid leave at the time.134 Under the statute, an
emergency worker is a “person who is registered with a local emergency
management organization . . . and holds an identification card issued by
the local emergency management director . . . or is an employee of the
state of Washington or any political subdivision thereof who is called upon
to perform emergency management activities.”135 The covered activities
that invoke liability protections are as follow:
Providing assistance . . . authorized by the department during an
emergency or disaster or search and rescue . . . whether such
assistance . . . is provided at the scene of the emergency or disaster or
search and rescue, at an alternative care site, at a hospital, or while in
route to or from such sites or between sites . . . .136

ii. Washington State Statutes Granting Volunteer Actor Immunity
Washington’s Good Samaritan statute covers any person who
provides “emergency care at the scene of an emergency [or]
transportat[ion from the scene] for emergency medical treatment ” without
an expectation of compensation.137 The Washington Good Samaritan
statute will provide that person with immunity from any action for civil
damages caused by an act or omission in rendering the emergency care if
the manner in which the emergency care was provided does not amount to
“gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.”138 The controlling
case law relating to the Good Samaritan statute is Maynard v. FernoWashington, Inc.139 In Maynard, the court found that the purpose of the
Good Samaritan statute is to “protect volunteer emergency workers
coming to the aid of an injured person from liability for simple negligence
that caused further injury to the injured person.”140

133. Id. § 38.52.180(4)(c).
134. See id. § 38.52.180(5)(a).
135. Id. § 38.52.010(7).
136. Id. § 38.52.180(5)(b).
137. Id. § 4.24.300(1).
138. See id. § 4.24.300(1).
139. Maynard v. Ferno-Washington, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1174 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
140. Id. at 1174.

2017]

The Home-Field Disadvantage

895

iii. Washington State Statutes Granting Private Actor Immunity
The State of Washington currently lacks a statutory scheme to grant
immunity to medical practitioners who are paid during a state of
emergency.
II. ISSUES WITH THE CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEMES
As they stand, the laws offering immunity to medical practitioners
during times of declared emergencies or disasters fail to provide legal
protection to the front line practitioners who are often the first to reach
surge capacity, as victims of a disaster seek care and are admitted to private
hospital facilities.141 Further, these laws are fractured and difficult to
navigate, lack standardization, and fail to provide uniform protections to
all disaster responders.142 In every PNEMA member state, the doctors
staffing emergency rooms and trauma centers do not currently enjoy the
same liability protections that are extended to federal or state government
actors or Good Samaritan volunteers.143
Hypothetically, the current legal landscape could allow for two
surgeons of equal skill and care, operating on the same patient, under the
same conditions, and with the same resources, to have the same civil action
brought against them and yet experience different degrees of liability. The
first surgeon could be held liable if he or she was either on call or working
at the time of the disaster. However, the second surgeon could be held not
liable due to the immunity that the surgeon receives under government
actor immunity, volunteer actor immunity, or mutual aid agreement statute
immunity.144 All of these factors contribute to a general unwillingness of
paid medical practitioners to respond to a disaster and provide care.145 Fear
of this “immunity gap” may lead to a decrease in doctors who are willing
to respond to hospital staffing requests during disasters.146
Currently, the law offers excellent immunity protections to
government actors, as well as to those medical practitioners who are
considered government actors by means of employment, agency, or
deputation.147 This expansion of “government actor” status may help to
141. See Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health, supra note 4, at 122.
142. See discussion supra Part I.C.
143. See discussion supra Part I.C.
144. See discussion supra Part I.C.
145. See Ahronheim, supra note 35, at 198–99.
146. Ahronheim, supra note 35, at 199; See Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med.
Ass’n, Code of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association § 9.06, at 355 (2014–15 ed.,
2014) (recognizing physicians have the right to decline to treat a patient); See id. § 9.067, at 363
(recognizing that physicians need to weigh the ability to treat future patients against treating the instant
patient).
147. See discussion supra Part I.
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address the immunity gap that private actor physicians fall into during
disasters. Federally, and across all four PNEMA states, government actor
medical practitioners receive immunity from civil liability as long as their
actions are within the scope of their duties and not grossly negligent,
wanton, or reckless.148
Two states, Washington and Oregon, have statutory schemes in place
that could offer volunteer medical practitioners immunity for their acts and
omissions during the disaster. Both approaches require that the volunteers
be preregistered with a government authority; however, Washington’s
approach also includes a restriction mandating that the preregistered
volunteers not receive compensation if they wish to receive immunity.149
By including such restrictions, Washington and the other PNEMA
member states, with the exception of Oregon, have stripped the frontline
medical practitioners, particularly doctors and nurses staffing emergency
rooms and trauma centers, of the ability to enjoy the same liability
protections that are extended to federal or state government actors or Good
Samaritan volunteers.150
Those in favor of maintaining the legal status quo seek to ensure that
society will continue to hold paid medical practitioners responsible for
their actions by allowing injured patients to recover damages.
Accountability is important because we equate being held accountable
with providing a better quality of care. But, should paid medical
practitioners not be held to the same standard as their volunteer
counterparts when practicing in a disaster area? If the care provided by
medical practitioners with immunity was notably below par and harming
patients, why does such widespread support for volunteer medical
provider immunity exist? Paid, governmental, and volunteer medical
practitioners should be held to the same standards of care and liability.
Granting immunity to paid medical practitioners during times of disaster
will not destroy the quality of care they give to their patients, just as it has
not destroyed the quality of care that volunteer or government actor
medical practitioners give to their patients. Granting immunity to paid
medical practitioners during disasters will perpetuate an idea of “same
conditions, same care, and same standards.”
Is it proper to extend the “benefit” of immunity to paid medical
practitioners during disasters when responding to the sick and injured is
what they are being paid to do? Being a medical practitioner in a disaster
area is well beyond the scope of what is required of a medical practitioner
in ordinary circumstances. The difference is so distinct that the State of
148. See discussion supra Part I.
149. See discussion supra Part I.C.3(c), (d).
150. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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Oregon will not allow any registered volunteer medical practitioner to
respond to a disaster without first receiving special training in the structure
of the emergency response system, emergency response operations,
emergency preparedness, disaster medicine, psychological first aid,
disaster life support, and wilderness first aid or medicine.151 Such training
is crucial to enable medical providers to respond to conditions beyond their
control that may call for them to perform above and beyond the call of
duty.
In recent memory, the most well-known instance of medical
practitioners caring for patients under dire circumstances are the events at
Memorial Medical Center in New Orleans, Louisiana, during Hurricane
Katrina in August of 2005.152 At the start of the hurricane, Memorial
sheltered 2,000 people, of which 200 were patients and 600 were staff.153
On the day the hurricane struck, the city’s power failed at 4:55 a.m.154 The
next day the storm had passed, but extensive flooding forced the hospital
to remain on backup generators. After almost 48 hours of continuous
operation, the backup generators failed at 2:00 a.m., two days after the
storm.155 The medical practitioners were then left in the dark to care for
130 patients, 52 of whom were critical.156 The hospital’s windows,
smashed in by the hurricane, let in the oppressively humid heat, bringing
the temperature in the building to over 100 degrees Fahrenheit and
allowing the flood waters of New Orleans, tainted with raw sewage and
corpses, to permeate the building.157 After the storm began, help did not
come for three days.158 In light of these events, it is clear that practicing
medicine is fundamentally different during a disaster and the laws applied
to medical practitioners during disasters should reflect that difference.
It is unrealistic to expect the same standard of care under disaster
conditions. We must not hinder paid medical practitioners with worries of
liability. Instead, we must design the laws that apply to medical
practitioners providing care under disaster conditions in a way that reflects
the reality of the situations in which they operate. Thus, the laws governing
medical practitioner immunity during disasters should be pragmatic and
supportive to all medical practitioners, regardless of their paid,
151. OR. ADMIN. R. 333-003-0140 (2016).
152. See generally SHERI FINK, FIVE DAYS AT MEMORIAL: LIFE AND DEATH IN A STORMRAVAGED HOSPITAL (2013).
153. Sheri Fink, The Deadly Choices at Memorial, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016) (Magazine),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/30/magazine/30doctors.html [https://perma.cc/3DKL-SET7].
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id.
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governmental, or volunteer status and should not place additional burdens
on them.
III. EXPANDING EMERGENCY RESPONSE EFFECTIVENESS
WITH EQUAL IMMUNITY
To simplify emergency management procedures and provide a
greater level of certainty and confidence to the medical community and
lawyers regarding how liability will be assessed after a disaster,
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Alaska should adopt the private liability
scheme proposed in the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
(MSEHPA).159
The Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown and Johns
Hopkins Universities drafted the MSEHPA at the request of the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention.160 It is model legislation intended for
consideration by the states as they draft their own legislative responses to
disasters and emergencies that impact public health.161 The MSEHPA
recognizes that “if . . . health professionals . . . are to fulfill their
responsibilities for preventing and responding to a serious health threat,
they should not fear unwarranted liability.”162
The MSEHPA seeks to “provide[] responsible state actors with the
powers they need to detect and contain a potentially catastrophic disease
outbreak and, at the same time, protect[] individual rights and
freedoms.”163 The MSEHPA accomplishes this goal in part by providing
private liability immunity during a public health emergency to the
following actors and stating:
Any private person, firm, or corporation and employees and agents
of such person, firm, or corporation, who renders assistance or advice
at the request of the State or its political subdivisions under the
provisions of this Act shall not be liable for causing the death of, or
injury to, any person or damage to any property except in the event
of gross negligence or willful misconduct.164

159. CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.’S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., THE
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (2001), http://www.aapsonline.org/legis/
msehpa2.pdf [https://perma.cc/E43L-2S9M].
160. Lawrence O. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health and
Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 4 (2003).
161. Id. at 5.
162. Id. at 19.
163. Id. at 5.
164. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT, supra note 159, at § 804(b)(3).
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During a state of emergency, the states involved need to call upon all
of their medical practitioners to help care for the ill or injured.165 The
breadth of the private actor immunity should include even those medical
practitioners who are being paid during the emergency because the
conditions in which they are required to perform are no less dire than those
in which volunteer medical practitioners find themselves. Reading the
MSEHPA’s private liability exemption as including paid medical
practitioners also helps to further its goal of providing the State with the
powers it needs to address a health related emergency by ensuring that
(1) no medical practitioners elect to leave in an attempt to avoid potential
liability, thus ensuring the maximum numbers of medical practitioners are
available to respond to the emergency; (2) medical practitioners will be
less likely to engage in the practice of “defensive medicine”;166 and
(3) medical resources will be used more efficiently in the absence of
defensive medicine, which is of critical importance because supplies may
become scarce during the emergency.
However, limitations on liability should not preclude recovery.
Rather than having injured patients seek damages against individual
medical practitioners, it could be more efficient, and equitable, for injured
patients to submit claims to a victims’ compensation fund created by the
individual states. Such funds already exist under the PREP Act.167 The
development of such a compensation fund will encourage medical
practitioners to participate in emergency response efforts by addressing
their apprehension about injury liability while attempting to practice in
disaster zone conditions. Further, the legal system will also ensure that
patients who are injured will be able to recover damages for their losses.
CONCLUSION
The implementation of the MSEHPA approach across all PNEMA
states will serve many purposes, including simplifying a presently
haphazard patchwork of immunity statutes and liability standards,
incentivizing medical practitioner participation in emergency response to
disaster, and promoting the more efficient use of both personnel and
resources when responding to a disaster. However, the most important
165. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-21: Public Health and Medical
Preparedness, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Oct. 18, 2007), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-21.htm
[https://perma.cc/DZ6N-DP3Z].
166. Defensive medicine is the practice by a physician of ordering many tests or consultations
as a means of self-protection against charges of malpractice in the event of an unfavorable outcome of
treatment. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 522 (2d ed. 1987).
167. HEALTH RES. & SERVICES ADMIN., COUNTERMEASURES INJURY COMP. PROGRAM
FACT SHEET, http://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/cicpfactsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML2X-KLZ5].
The
Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program is the injury compensation fund for the PREP Act.
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outcome of implementing the MSEHPA approach would be closing the
liability gap and eliminating the home-field disadvantage many doctors
experience. Under normal conditions, the burden of potential liability is an
important part of maintaining a safe medical system by serving as a
deterrent to negligent or reckless medical treatment. But in a time of crisis,
the burden of potential liability is amplified by the chaos of mass-triage,
having to practice medicine in potentially dangerous conditions, and the
sudden unreliability of available, required medical facilities and supplies.
During a crisis, the burden of liability is amplified to the point that it
may prove to be harmful to patients by incentivizing a doctor to practice
defensive medicine and utilize more than the minimum supplies required.
Further, the burden may bias a doctor’s triage evaluation towards
recommending a “judgment call” patient be listed as an expected fatality
instead of providing care that may have an increased risk of complications
or death, and therefore liability, because of the conditions posed by the
crisis. By temporarily waiving the burden of liability during a crisis, we
give doctors more options for allocating medical resources and
determining the best course of treatment for their patient. By being flexible
during a crisis and removing the usual restraints imposed by the burden of
liability, we are furthering the ultimate goal of better protecting and
preserving the health of disaster victims and the public at large.

